Communicative Action as an Approach to Ecumenical Dialogue

By Erin Michele Brigham

Contemporary ecumenists such as Konrad Raiser, Oscar Cullman and Michael Kinnamon have observed a "crisis" in the ecumenical movement. During the years shortly following the groundbreaking publication of "Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry" (BEM) in 1982, there was a period of "stagnation if not resignation",¹ an observable "ecumenical impatience",² an "impoverishment" in vision.³ Those who have witnessed the churches' decline in ecumenical enthusiasm have noticed a lack of shared vision or an unclear goal in the ecumenical movement. The central committee of the World Council of Churches (WCC) echoed these concerns in the 1997 "Common Understanding and Vision" (CUV) document, stressing the urgency for the World Council of Churches to articulate a self-understanding that will promote ecumenical growth in the 21st century.⁴

In this paper, I argue that ecumenical enthusiasm can be rekindled through a reconstruction of unity that reflects the reality of a pluralistic context. One of my guiding assumptions is that the lack of consensus on the goal of ecumenism presents an opportunity to realize the principles of the 1950 Toronto statement. This foundational declaration of the World Council of Churches' ecclesiological neutrality is an acknowledgement of diverse ecclesial self-understandings. Drafted in the era of ecumenical enthusiasm, it highlights the need for churches to discover unity through an honest exchange of their diverse ecclesiologies without conforming to a preconceived model of what the visible church will be. The principles of this statement, I suggest, are suitable for the contemporary pluralistic context that we face and should be highlighted in the re-conception of the goal of ecumenism.

I will construct an approach to ecumenical dialogue by using Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action as a methodology. As a philosopher and critical theorist, Habermas addresses the pluralism of the Western world in the 20th century, a context which he describes as post-metaphysical. Through his framework of communicative rationality, he offers a convincing way to talk about the possibility of communicating across difference and sharing a common truth that does not rely on metaphysical axioms.

The theory of communicative action is helpful in addressing ecumenical dialogue particularly in the way in which it distinguishes between action oriented towards understanding and action oriented towards other goals. As a goal-oriented action, the ecumenical movement can benefit from Habermas' insights on the limited unifying potential of this type of interaction. Drawing upon Habermas' theory of communicative action, I argue that the way in which the goal of the ecumenical movement is articulated will influence the shape of the ecumenical dialogue itself. A model of visible unity, if predetermined, does not allow for the dominance-free discourse required for the achievement of mutual understanding among the churches. Using communicative action as a methodology for ecumenical dialogue invites churches to develop a vision of unity discursively and, through the process of that discourse, also to coordinate their actions and deepen their level of doctrinal consensus.

I approach this endeavour in three ways. First, I will present a trajectory of understandings that have informed the goal of ecumenism throughout the 20th century. Starting with the Toronto statement of 1950, I will show how the beginnings of ecclesiological neutrality shifted to focus on a model of organic unity. This model, developed at New Delhi, requires a significant level of ecclesial uniformity which would prove to be a challenge for many churches. As we trace further progress in the 20th century, one may observe the emergence of alternative models while organic unity remains a favoured model for the World Council of Churches. The consideration of alternative models and the greater recognition of diversity broadened the WCC's understanding of unity, contributing to the ambiguity of the current ecumenical climate.

Next, I will describe features of Habermas' theory of communicative action that will serve as the methodology for contemporary ecumenical dialogue. First, I will highlight Habermas' distinction between communicative action and strategic action. Then, I will explore types of discourse and the types of validity claims that these discourses raise. This topic will raise the question of Habermas' understanding of consensus and universality.

In the final section of the paper, I will apply Habermas' theory of communicative action to ecumenical dialogue. The implications of this approach will affirm the principles of the Toronto statement on ecclesiological diversity, which are particularly suitable for the ecumenical context today. Furthermore, applying communicative action to ecumenical dialogue will make the following claims that may foster ecumenical optimism and commitment. First, the goal of ecumenical dialogue cannot be imposed upon any church. The nature of visible unity must be realized discursively. Second, consensus serves as a regulating principle of the dialogue itself. We should not be discouraged if the ideal of visible unity is not an immediate reality because unity is realized in the process, not just the end result.

Context

This brief survey of how the goal of visible unity has been understood and articulated in the context of the ecumenical movement is by no means exhaustive.⁵ My intention is to illustrate the development and decline of the WCC's preference for the model of organic unity. I begin by examining the significance of the Toronto statement of 1950, only two years after the formation of the WCC. I suggest that the third assembly of the WCC at New Delhi marks a shift away from the principles of the Toronto statement towards a more clearly defined model of ecclesial unity that would be influential for subsequent developments. The latter part of the 20th century presents another shift, from privileging the model of organic unity to the recognition of multiple models. Examining the historical trajectory of statements on visible unity allows us better to understand the rise and decline of ecumenical enthusiasm that has been observed in our context.

Prior to the New Delhi assembly of 1961, the WCC avoided offering a precise definition of unity. This can be observed in the tone set by the WCC central committee at Toronto in 1950, which explicitly states that "membership in the World Council does not imply the acceptance of a specific doctrine concerning the nature of unity."⁶ This is grounded in the ecclesiological neutrality of the WCC, which is affirmed at Toronto. The statement declares, "There are room and space in the World Council for the ecclesiology of every Church which is ready to participate in the ecumenical conversation…"⁷ It continues, stating that "no Church is obliged to change its ecclesiology as a consequence of membership in the World Council".⁸

The central committee of the WCC is able to refrain from making a pronouncement on the nature of the church because it recognizes that each member church has its own ecclesial self-understanding. They are careful to explain that the World Council of Churches is not a church itself. The Toronto statement clearly affirms that "the World Council of Churches is not and must never become a Super-Church".⁹ The implications of this statement are significant. The nature of the church is not prejudged. Therefore, the World Council of Churches can accommodate diverse ecclesiologies, from the highly structured ecclesiology of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches to the free-church model of Quakers and Pentecostals. The meaning of visible unity is not presupposed by the WCC and the council itself does not claim the authority to resolve the question on the nature of the unity we seek.

The third assembly of the WCC at New Delhi met in 1961, only eleven years after the Toronto statement. The approach to the nature of visible unity differed significantly from the central committee at Toronto. Instead of avoiding a pronouncement on the nature of the unity sought by the WCC, they offered a definition of organic unity which framed (more than the Toronto statement) the 20th century debates on the goal of ecumenical dialogue. The New Delhi statement on unity is widely regarded as the touchstone for the World Council of Churches' position on visible unity. Michael Kinnamon argues that the 1961 definition of unity "set the tone" for the twentieth century ecumenical movement.¹⁰ Similarly, Harding Meyer describes it as the "magna carta of the twentieth century ecumenical movement".¹¹ According to Meyer, the New Delhi statement laid out both "the nature of unity" and "its constitutive elements", thus offering a foundational definition upon which all subsequent concepts of unity build.¹²

The New Delhi statement is groundbreaking in the ecumenical movement in its specificity in expressing the nature of its goal. The assembly report, after two deliberative sessions and amendments, produced the following statement on unity:

We believe that the unity which is both God's will and his gift to his Church is being made visible as all in each place who are baptized into Jesus Christ and confess him as Lord and Saviour are brought by the Holy Spirit into one fully committed fellowship, holding the apostolic faith, preaching the one Gospel, breaking the one bread, joining in common prayer, and having a corporate life reaching out in witness and service to all and who at the same time are united with the whole Christian fellowship in all places and all ages in such ways that ministry and members are accepted by all and that all can act and speak together as occasion requires for the tasks to which God calls his people.¹³

New Delhi specifically outlined the understanding of visible unity. The nature of the unity described by New Delhi is one of locally visible, fully committed fellowship. This is expressed in the key words, "all in each place". Visible unity, according to this model, is an expression of a shared life by people who occupy a common place. The goal of unity in each place aims to overcome divisions that are experienced in the real-life contexts of Christians living together in various localities. This understanding of unity "in each place" is expressed in the model of organic union. As the model connotes, organic union may be likened to a living organism, in which all parts function together to support and sustain the life of the whole. Organic unity means unity at the most foundational basis, in each locality. It requires a high level of commonality (although not uniformity) as to be described as one church, including a common authoritative ministry that can speak and act on behalf of the whole church.¹⁴

New Delhi's vision of unity makes high demands on the churches in terms of adjusting one's confessional identity. Organic union, Melanie May suggests, requires a "death and rebirth of churches as we know them".¹⁵ Likewise, Michael Kinnamon points out this tension between organic unity and confessional diversity, stating, "There seems little doubt that the dominant opinion of the WCC, at least through the New Delhi assembly, was that church unity and confessional identity are fundamentally opposed".¹⁶ Although the model of organic union has since been challenged by those who argue for the legitimacy of confessional diversity, New Delhi did set the tone for discussions on visible unity in many ways. This is evident in the way in which the subsequent statements on unity explicitly express their continuity with New Delhi.

The fourth assembly of the World Council of Churches in Uppsala in 1968 developed the theme of catholicity. This theme allowed the assembly to emphasize the universality of the church. The assembly declared its continuity with New Delhi, affirming its mandate to manifest unity to "all in each place". The Uppsala assembly builds upon New Delhi, stating:

So to the emphasis on "all in each place" we would now add a fresh understanding of the unity of all Christians in all places. This calls the churches in all places to realize that they belong together and are called to act together. In a time when human interdependence is so evident, it is the more imperative to make visible the bonds which unite Christians in universal fellowship.¹⁷

The Uppsala report provided the impetus for the fifth assembly in Nairobi (1975) to emphasize the concept of conciliarity. Conciliarity provides a tangible and efficacious realization of catholicity. It is the way in which churches can act together in each place and make their bond visible to the world. The Nairobi report affirms the New Delhi statement on unity and explicitly declares that conciliarity is meant to complement, not replace, organic unity. They carefully refute suggestions that conciliarity may be an alternative model to organic unity. Rather, conciliar fellowship is presented as a complement to organic union. The Nairobi assembly states:

The term, "conciliar fellowship" has been frequently misunderstood. It does not look towards a conception of unity different from that full organic unity sketched in the New Delhi statement, but is rather a further elaboration of it. The term is intended to describe an aspect of the life of the one undivided Church at all levels … True conciliar fellowship presupposes the unity of the Church.¹⁸

The seventh assembly at Canberra (1991) highlighted the biblical theme of koinonia as a model for union. This model presents the church as a communion of communions which is modelled on the life of the Trinity. The model reflects the ecclesiological studies of Faith and Order that led up to the Fifth World Conference of Faith and Order in Santiago de Compostela, Spain (1993). The conference described koinonia as rooted in the life of the Trinity, inseparable from participation in community life, and expressed in witness and service to the world.¹⁹ The Faith and Order commission's report stresses that koinonia is not a new model of unity. It is the foundation of all of the existing models of unity but it does not replace any of them.²⁰ The report does not make a specific reference to the model of organic unity, but at no point is it challenged. This could reflect the awareness of multiple models of union that emerged in the past few decades, which challenged the model of organic union.

The ninth and most recent assembly in Porte Alegre (2006) quotes the Canberra assembly in affirming the model of koinonia as the visible unity we seek. Porto Alegre invites churches to discern how they may enter into fuller koinonia with each other, stressing that the unity sought will be a "oneness in rich diversity".²¹ In addition to the previously mentioned features of unity, including catholicity and conciliarity, Porto Alegre invites the churches to embrace "mutual accountability" as a characteristic of ecclesial unity. Mutual accountability requires churches to recognize their need for each other. Furthermore, it suggests that "Each church must become aware of all that is provisional in its life and have the courage to acknowledge this to other churches".²² The ninth assembly carefully affirmed ecclesial diversity, while acknowledging the provisional character of denominational differences.

From New Delhi to Porto Alegre, one can observe a significant broadening in the WCC's understanding of visible unity. The vision of organic union presented at New Delhi engendered a great deal of enthusiasm for a certain kind of visible unity. As the century progressed however, alternative models emerged, placing organic unity alongside other visions. The multiplicity of visions of the ecumenical goal reflects diverse theological approaches to ecumenism. Perhaps the shift away from certainty in the nature of the ecumenical goal has contributed to the ecumenical crisis to which Raiser refers. I argue, however, in light of the principles of communicative action, that the loss of certainty in the goal may benefit the ecumenical movement.

Methodology

The scope of this paper does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of Jürgen Habermas' complex and interdisciplinary thought. The aim of this section is to introduce the theory of communicative action to the extent that it will facilitate understanding of my application of its principles to ecumenical dialogue. In order to accomplish this, I will address the following themes: how Habermas develops communicative rationality, how he distinguishes between strategic and communicative action, and how he differentiates types of discourse and consensus.

In a post-modern context, Habermas stands out as one of the "last great rationalists".²³ In an intellectual era largely defined by its rejection of Enlightenment themes, Habermas argues that the project of modernity is incomplete. He advocates for a critical retrieval of the modern emphasis on reason. Recognizing the problems with the Enlightenment use of subject-centred reason, Habermas argues for a paradigm shift towards an inter-subjective understanding of rationality. This can be accomplished, he argues, through a change of philosophical frameworks. Habermas' rationality is to be understood in the paradigm of language rather than the paradigm of consciousness. The model of reason that emerges in the paradigm of consciousness which dominated Western philosophy from Descartes to Kant, Habermas argues, is characterized by the relationship between subject and object. Within this framework, the rational subject gains access to truth through its ability to grasp reasonable objects. Rationality, in this model, is located either in the realm of subjects or objects, failing to acknowledge the way in which we come to knowledge inter-subjectively. ²⁴

This model of reason, Habermas argues, which locates truth in the subject or the object necessarily falls into either positivism or relativism. This dichotomy can be overcome only through the paradigm of language, which locates knowledge in the social realm of inter-subjectivity. Habermas seeks to reinterpret the modern understanding of reason from within the framework of language in his development of communicative rationality. Habermas suggests that communicative rationality avoids the pitfalls of relativism and positivism, providing a helpful framework for addressing our post-metaphysical age. On one hand, the framework of communicative rationality acknowledges that truth is historically located and open to critique. On the other hand, it affirms the rational character of knowledge, opening the possibility for reaching a shared truth through inter-subjective understanding.²⁵

Communicative rationality provides the foundation for Habermas' theory of communicative action. The theory analyzes how we coordinate thoughts and actions through the way in which we use language. Ultimately, Habermas wants to describe the formal pragmatics of language. That is to say, he seeks to demonstrate, in his theory of communicative action, that there is a universal rational structure behind human communication. The universal aspect of language is not found on a semantic level, Habermas points out. Rather, it is our human ability to use language, or our communicative competence that is universal. Communicative competence is not about putting sentences together according to the grammatical laws of our particular language. Rather, it refers to our ability to do something effectively in the act of saying something. Habermas uses the speech act theory of John Austin and John Searle to reinforce this principle. Speech act theory distinguishes between three aspects of communication: locutionary (saying something), perlocutionary (having an effect on the hearer through saying something) and illocutionary (doing something by saying something).²⁶ Habermas is particularly interested in the illocutionary aspect of speech acts; namely, what we are doing through what we are saying.

Using the distinction between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts, Habermas argues that communication is primarily aimed towards understanding. The illocutionary aims of a speech act are evident to both participants in communication because they are built into the structure of the speech act itself. Conversely, the perlocutionary aims of a speech act are located in the intention of the speaker. They can be unknown to the hearer. The success of illocutionary acts is measured by the degree of understanding that they facilitate between speaker and hearer. The success of the perlocution cannot be measured in the speech act itself and are secondary to the illocutionary success of understanding.²⁷ From this observation, Habermas concludes that the fundamental goal behind language-use is mutual understanding. All other goals are secondary and "parasitic" to language oriented towards mutual understanding.²⁸ So an individual may use communication for a purpose other than the facilitation of mutual understanding but this is secondary to the primary function of communication itself.

This reflection provides the foundation for Habermas' definition of communicative action. Communicative action is "the type of interaction in which all participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation".²⁹ So, perlocutionary aims, which come from the intention of individual participants and are not harmonized with the other intentions of other participants in the communicative encounter, do not make up communicative action. Habermas defines such acts, which are aimed towards individual success rather than mutual understanding, as strategic.³¹ Strategic aims can interfere with the process of communicative action because, as suggested in Habermas' definition, communicative action requires that all intentions of the participants must be harmonized. If one or more participant holds an undisclosed aim, then the other participants are not free to enter into the conversation without reservation.

The binding force of communicative action, that which motivates participants to coordinate their actions together, must lie in the rational force of the illocutions themselves. This is unlike strategic action, which must rely on non-rational means of cohesion (a participant cannot rationally engage in the speech act if he or she is not aware of all perlocutionary aims). Habermas describes the rationally binding structure of communicative action in his description of validity claims. He identifies different validity claims that are built into speech acts themselves including truth, rightness and truthfulness.³² Distinctions between speech acts are understood in terms of their illocutionary function (constatives, regulatives and expressives) and the reality to which they refer (objective, subjective and social). Together, these elements make up the organizational structure of Habermas' theory of communicative action.

When the interlocutors fail to achieve mutual understanding in the exchange of speech acts, the implicit validity claims must be made explicit through the process of discourse. Through discourse, the participants engage in a reflective form of communicative action in which they argue for the reasonable acceptability of their validity claims. Just as there are different types of validity claims, there are different types of corresponding discourse. Furthermore, discourses are aimed at different levels of consensus that justify the validity claims raised.

For example, Habermas understands the justification of empirical truth claims in terms of ideal consensus by all participants. This is possible because these validity claims relate to the objective world that is independent of the particular perspective of the individual. At the same time, however, he does not expect the same level of consensus for the justification of claims of sincerity or truthfulness. These validity claims are dependent on the subjective world of the individual and are therefore limited in terms of universal justifiability. This concept is further clarified in his differentiation between moral and ethical discourse.

In his 1993 work, Justification and Application, Habermas distinguishes between ethical and moral discourses by their respective aims. Ethical discourses, which raise the claim to authenticity, are aimed at establishing what is meaningful and valuable for a particular individual or group. Conversely, moral discourses are aimed at establishing universal justice that transcends particular preferences. Ethical discourses, according to Habermas, raise claims to authenticity (which are distinguishable from truth or rightness claims). Authenticity claims can refer to a particular individual, as in the case of existential-ethical discourse or to a group, as in the case of ethical-political discourse. It is important to note that the validity claim is justified through a particular level of consensus and not necessarily an ideal or universal level of consensus.³³

This differentiation between levels of expected consensus according to the type of discourse follows the development of Habermas' understanding of truth. In his early development of a consensus theory of truth, Habermas was more inclined to associate truth with universal consensus. Ideal consensus could be imagined as the ideal speech situation, in which participants enter freely into agreement by assenting to the most rational argument. He admitted that the ideal speech situation is "often counterfactual" but that it serves as a regulating principle for the discursive process.³⁴ In his most recent works, Habermas presents a revision of his earlier theory of truth. Now, he offers a more realist rather than idealist notion of truth, which emphasizes the importance of the observable world as the measure of truth rather than an ideal speech situation.³⁵

Constructive proposal

In his theory of communicative action, Habermas articulates a way to understand how people coordinate their ideas and actions through communication. In a sense, ecumenical dialogue highlights the same thing: how the churches coordinate ideas and actions through communication. Therefore, I would like to demonstrate how the theory of communicative action supports and challenges the developments in contemporary understandings of ecumenism. I suggest that the theory of communicative action may be applied both as an analytical tool and as a constructive approach to ecumenical dialogue. As a tool of analysis, it sheds light on some of the assumptions behind the goal and nature of ecumenical dialogue that have been articulated throughout the history of the ecumenical movement. As a constructive approach, communicative action presents principles for ecumenical dialogue in the contemporary pluralistic context of the 21st century.

My application of Habermas' methodology to ecumenical dialogue is organized under two sections. In the first section, "what kind of unity", I will analyze the various understandings of the goal of ecumenical dialogue, exploring how models of unity have been presented in the context of 20th century ecumenism. Using Habermas' distinction between communicative action and strategic action, I will suggest that using a pre-established model of unity can pre-suppose the goal of ecumenical dialogue and actually be a hindrance to the unifying process of dialogue. In the second section, "what kind of dialogue", I will use Habermas' types of discourse and levels of consensus to develop an understanding of how ecumenical dialogue can facilitate unity in difference. In this section, I will argue that the process of dialogue can be unifying in itself and that consensus can serve as a regulative ideal but it does not have to be realized for the success of ecumenism.

What kind of unity: Reflections on the goal

Earlier I asserted that the lack of certainty can be an asset for ecumenical dialogue from the perspective of the theory of communicative action. This assertion is grounded in Habermas' distinction between communicative and strategic action. The goal of communicative action is mutual understanding, which Habermas finds to be built into the very telos of communication. Conversely, strategic action follows additional goals that are added by individual participants and are not necessarily agreed upon by all communicators. In making this distinction, Habermas demonstrates how the goals of communication shape the way in which it is approached.

From this perspective, if the World Council of Churches elevates a particular model of unity prior to consensus on the model from all participants, it pre-supposes a goal prior to mutual understanding. I would like to suggest that such a presupposition of organic unity as the goal of ecumenical dialogue is not compatible with communicative action. The theory of communicative action stresses the need for each participant to be willing to enter into the dialogue without coercion in regard to the goal. Since the model of organic unity does not resonate with each church, it cannot serve as a shared goal.

The theory of communicative action would locate the nature of visible unity as a topic of the dialogue in order to reach mutual understanding prior to defining it in terms of the goal of the dialogue. This principle requires openness from the churches and neutrality on the part of the World Council of Churches in regard to the nature of the unity we seek. Churches must be able to freely exchange understandings of visible unity without directing their encounters towards the preferred model of organic unity. The role of the World Council of Churches, in this sense, would be to facilitate such a free exchange through maintaining ecclesiological neutrality.

The Toronto statement of 1950 laid the foundation for these ecumenical principles, inviting churches to openness regarding ecclesiological diversity without sacrificing their own ecclesial identity or explicitly acknowledging the ecclesial status of other churches. The statement also guaranteed the ecclesial neutrality of the World Council of Churches, declaring that it does not favour a particular ecclesiology nor does it claim to have the status of super-church. The principles of communicative action would resonate with the Toronto statement that "membership in the World Council does not imply the acceptance of a specific doctrine concerning the nature of unity."³⁶ This statement resists strategic action by rejecting the imposition of a particular ecumenical goal onto the churches. It invites a free exchange of ideas on the nature of visible unity; hence, it aims for understanding prior to any secondary goals in the dialogue.

I argue that the contemporary ecumenical context is particularly conducive to supporting the principles of communicative action. Rather than understanding the current ambiguity in terms of crisis, I suggest that it is an opportunity to reclaim the foundational principles of the Toronto statement. The decline of certainty about the nature of visible unity allows us to affirm the plurality of legitimate models and enter into the process of coming to mutual understanding.

What kind of dialogue: Reflections on the process

As previously mentioned, mutual understanding, the goal of communicative action is achieved through the free assent to rationally justifiable validity claims. This process is made explicit through discourse, in which the validity claims are brought forward and assessed on the basis of their rational force. Understanding, in Habermas' view implies a level of consensus on the validity claims raised in the discourse. However, as Habermas' develops his discourse theory, particularly in his work on ethics and political theory, he presents different types of discourses that render more complex the notion of consensus. Habermas differentiates between truth claims in reference to the empirical world and authenticity claims in reference to one's ethical-existential or ethical-political projects. In Habermas' view, the claim to authenticity does not necessitate universal consensus in the same way that empirical or moral validity claims do. Habermas' discourse theory invites us to ask what type of discourse most suitably describes ecumenical dialogue. This question is significant because the type of discourse shapes the kind of validity claims that are raised and aims at different levels of justificatory consensus.

I argue that ecumenical dialogue is best understood within Habermas' category of ethical-political discourse. This type of discourse, according to Habermas, aims to establish what is good and true for a particular group in light of their story, tradition and values. It does not aim to establish universal moral norms that apply to people in general, regardless of their particular contexts. Furthermore, the dialogue does not raise truth claims about the empirical world. While there is an empirical dimension to the church, it is also an object of faith for a particular group. This cannot be justified through empirical truth claims or claims about humanity in general. Ecumenical dialogue cannot be removed from the context of the Christian narrative. The topics of dialogue, the participants in the dialogue and the goal of the dialogue are all grounded in the belief in the Christian church. It relies on the assumption that Christ lays the foundation for a unified church, that this church continues to exist despite visible divisions, and that there is a not-yet dimension to the church that will be realized in the future.

According to Habermas, ethical-political discourses do not necessitate the same level of consensus for their justification as empirical truth claims. Consensus serves as a regulatory principle for the process but it is an ideal that does not require achievement for the success of the discourse. In light of this principle, I would like to stress the success of ecumenical dialogue despite the persistence of disagreements. The process of dialogue aimed at mutual understanding is unifying in itself. This realization is particularly inspiring in an age of ecumenical uncertainty.

Conclusion

While the lack of certainty about the goal of the ecumenical movement may cause anxiety for some ecumenists, it also provides the opportunity for discovering something new. I have argued that communicative action is an appropriate model for ecumenical dialogue in this context of uncertainty. It allows us to see the unifying potential in the pursuit of open and honest communication itself. The lack of a preconceived, empirical goal is a positive thing, according to this model. It allows communication partners to harmonize their aims rather than entering into the dialogue with an alternative goal.

Coming together in mutual understanding and coordinating our actions based on this mutual understanding is unifying in itself. The goal of mutual understanding through communicative action does not replace the goal of unity. Rather, it facilitates the ongoing process towards full and visible unity. Finally, I think that suspending our pre-understandings of visible unity affirms that the ecumenical movement is, at its core, the work of God. We do not know what the church will ultimately look like because, at its deepest level, it is a mystery. However, we can and should acknowledge the unity that we presently share as we engage in the communication that will bring communion.